How Banks Traded Currencies Before the Internet

Banks traded currencies before the internet by agreeing prices over telephone lines, exchanging typed messages through telex and dedicated dealing systems, and settling payments through banking accounts. A dealer could commit the bank to a large transaction in a brief conversation. Moving the money was a separate operation.

The market was not a room where everyone gathered. In London and other major financial centers, banks dealt from their own offices, connected by telecommunications. Most wholesale transactions exchanged bank deposits denominated in different currencies, not bundles of banknotes. This distinction runs through the Bank of England’s 1980 account of foreign exchange dealing.

Nor does “before the internet” mean “before computers.” The useful distinction is between a market organized around conversations and private connections, and one increasingly organized around electronic matching. Within the wider history of forex trading, this article follows the practical process: obtaining a quote, accepting a trade, managing the resulting position and arranging payment.

Why Banks Needed to Trade With Other Banks

A customer transaction creates two sides to a bank’s currency position. If a British importer buys dollars with pounds, the bank sells dollars and receives pounds. Unless another transaction offsets that exchange, the bank has changed its exposure to both currencies.

Consider a hypothetical importer buying $5 million to pay an American supplier. Its bank has several choices. It could use dollars already available, buy dollars from another bank, or offset the transaction against a different customer selling dollars. These choices are not interchangeable: each has implications for currency exposure, funding and payment timing.

Suppose the bank sells the importer $5 million and immediately buys $5 million from another dealer for the same settlement date. Ignoring charges and other positions, it has offset the dollar amount. Its commercial result depends on the difference between the customer rate and the rate paid in the interbank market.

If it replaces only $3 million, the remaining $2 million is still exposed to exchange rate movements. A rise in the dollar would make that remaining purchase more expensive. The interbank deal therefore need not represent a fresh prediction about currencies. It can be the practical consequence of serving a customer.

Direct Dealing and Voice Brokers

Banks had two broad routes to a transaction: deal directly with another bank, or use a foreign exchange broker to find the other side. Direct communication could use telephone, telex or an electronic dealing system. Voice brokers relayed prices over lines connected to dealing rooms.

Access depended on more than finding an attractive exchange rate. Banks also needed acceptable counterparties and available credit lines. The Bank of England’s 1995 market survey documents these parallel channels and the importance of credit availability when accepting brokered prices.

The practical difference is easiest to see through an example. A dealer needing dollars could contact Bank B and ask for a price. Alternatively, the dealer could ask a broker to locate an offer. In the first case, the search starts with a chosen counterparty. In the second, an intermediary helps locate available business.

A brokered quote still leaves a separate question: can these two institutions transact with each other? An excellent price from an unacceptable counterparty does not solve the bank’s problem. Price and permission are different matters.

The telephone was therefore a trading interface, not just an office accessory. The broader development of these connections belongs to the history of telephone trading and dealing rooms; in foreign exchange, their purpose was to turn a price enquiry into an agreed currency obligation.

What a Currency Quote Meant

A two-way quote gives the price at which the quoting bank will buy and the price at which it will sell the base currency. The difference is the spread. The direction must be read from the quoting bank’s perspective, otherwise the numbers become an expensive misunderstanding.

The following is an illustrative example, not a historical transcript. Assume Bank A asks Bank B for a sterling–dollar price for £2 million, with the settlement date already established. Bank B quotes 1.5000–1.5005 dollars per pound.

Part of the quote Meaning for Bank B Meaning for Bank A
Bid: $1.5000 per pound Buys pounds and sells dollars Can sell pounds at this rate
Offer: $1.5005 per pound Sells pounds and buys dollars Can buy pounds at this rate
Amount: £2 million Applies the agreed rate to £2 million Must make its chosen direction clear

If Bank A buys £2 million at the offer, it owes $3,001,000. If it sells £2 million at the bid, it receives $3,000,000. The $1,000 difference represents the spread applied to that amount, not a guaranteed profit for either institution.

The calculation also shows why “buy two million” is incomplete without context. Two million pounds is not two million dollars. The currency pair, direction, amount, rate and settlement date must all describe the same transaction on both sides.

Speed does not remove that requirement. A short conversation can carry a complete agreement, but only when the participants share the relevant conventions and confirm what they have done.

How Dealers Managed the Position After a Trade

Executing a customer order and managing its consequences are separate decisions. A useful way to examine the dealer’s task is to follow the position rather than the telephone call.

Return to the bank that sold $5 million to an importer. Assume it receives a second customer order selling $4 million for the same settlement date. The two customer transactions offset most of the dollar amount, leaving a net requirement to buy $1 million.

Buying the full $5 million between those customer orders would produce a different result. After receiving the exporter’s $4 million, the bank would have excess dollars relative to this simplified set of transactions. It would then need to retain or sell them.

Neither sequence automatically tells us whether the dealer made a good decision. Waiting might avoid an interbank trade, but it also leaves the bank exposed while it waits. Hedging immediately reduces that exposure but incurs the cost of dealing.

The same reasoning applies to quote selection. Suppose one counterparty offers a slightly better price but can provide only half the required amount. Another can complete the whole transaction. Comparing the displayed rates alone misses the cost and uncertainty of finding the balance.

This is why a dealing operation cannot be judged solely by whether it bought low and sold high. Amount, timing, available counterparties and the unfinished portion of an order all matter.

From the Deal Record to the Back Office

A completed conversation still needed an accurate operational record. The bank had to distinguish the dealer’s decision from the checking and processing that followed it.

Historical inspection material provides a useful view of those controls. Japan’s financial supervisory agency asked whether trading details were entered promptly, whether the back office monitored all transactions, whether incomplete deal tickets were controlled, and whether someone other than the trader sent confirmations. These checks appear in its bank inspection checklist for trading and back-office operations.

Applied to the £2 million example, the record should allow an independent checker to establish that Bank A bought pounds, sold $3,001,000, dealt with Bank B and agreed a particular settlement date. A rate entered correctly beside the wrong currency amount would still describe the wrong obligation.

Three stages should be kept separate:

  • Execution: the parties agree the transaction.
  • Confirmation: the parties check that their records match.
  • Settlement: the payment obligations are discharged.

Confirmation is not another opportunity to choose a better exchange rate. Its purpose is to identify discrepancies in what the parties believe they agreed. Settlement, in turn, requires more than a correctly recorded price.

How the Payment Instructions Travelled

SWIFT belongs to the history of bank communication, but it should not be confused with a currency exchange or a matching engine. Its role was financial messaging. The service went live in 1977, connecting 518 institutions in 22 countries, well before public web trading. The launch is documented in SWIFT’s institutional history.

The distinction is practical. Agreeing to buy pounds answers “what have we traded?” A payment instruction addresses “where must the funds go?” Sending that instruction does not itself prove that both sides have received their money.

Take a simplified transaction in which Bank A must deliver dollars and receive pounds. Its operational task includes identifying the correct receiving accounts and arranging the dollar payment. It must also establish whether the expected sterling receipt arrived. A successful outgoing payment and a successful incoming payment are two separate events.

This remains true even if every message travels electronically. Better communication can reduce processing friction; it does not, by itself, make two payments simultaneous.

The Risk Between Paying and Being Paid

Settlement risk became painfully visible on June 26, 1974, when German authorities closed Bankhaus Herstatt. Some counterparties had already paid Deutsche marks but had not received the corresponding dollars in New York. The failure disrupted payment and settlement arrangements, as documented in the BIS study of foreign exchange settlement risk and Herstatt.

The exposure was not just the cost of replacing an unfavorable exchange rate. A bank that had paid away its currency could be waiting for the full value of the other currency.

For a simplified $10 million exchange, that distinction matters. A small exchange rate movement might change the replacement cost by thousands of dollars. Failure to receive the purchased currency after paying could expose the bank to the entire principal it had delivered.

Faster execution and safer settlement therefore solve different problems. A dealer might agree a trade almost instantly while the bank remained exposed during the payment process. The telephone was not the only bottleneck, and replacing it did not remove every risk.

Electronic Trading Arrived Before Web Trading

The transition began with electronic conversation rather than automatic matching. Reuters introduced its Monitor Dealing Service in the early 1980s and replaced it with Dealing 2000-1 in 1989. These systems connected dealers for bilateral communication; they did not perform the wider matching role of a broker.

Reuters Dealing 2000-2 introduced automated broking in April 1992. EBS launched its system in September 1993. The distinction between electronic conversation and electronic matching is set out in the BIS history of electronic foreign exchange trading.

The change was not an overnight replacement of speech by screens. In the US brokers’ market, automated order matching accounted for 57% of turnover in 1998, compared with 18% in 1995. Those figures concern brokered turnover, not all foreign exchange transactions, and appear in the Foreign Exchange Committee’s 1998 annual report.

That sequence prevents a common historical mix-up. Banks did not wait for browser-based platforms to trade electronically. Dedicated institutional systems came before the later expansion of online retail forex trading.

What the Old Dealing Process Reveals

Following one transaction from enquiry to payment makes the old market easier to understand. Finding a price, accepting it, recording the obligation, managing the currency position and completing settlement are different tasks. A telephone conversation could handle the agreement without handling everything else.

The most useful contrast is therefore not “old and slow” against “new and fast.” It is a change in how banks searched for counterparties, communicated decisions and processed the resulting obligations. The equipment changed; the need to agree the right trade and receive the promised currency did not.